The Development and Reform of the Modern International Financial System by L. Randall Wray
The  Development  and  Reform  of the 
Modern  International  Financial  System 
L.  Randall  Wray* 
Working  Paper  No. 225 
January  1998 
*Senior  Scholar,  The  Jerome  Levy  Economics  Institute 
I  would  like  to  thank  Jan  Kregel  and  John  Harvey  for  comments.  An  early  version  of  this  paper  was 
presented  at a seminar  at the Economic  Policy  Institute,  and I would  like to thank  participants  for  comments. ABSTRACT 
The  international  financial  system  might  be  said  to  be  in  crisis.  It  requires  frequent 
intervention  by  central  banks  and  other  national  and  international  bodies  to  reduce  fluctuations 
of  currencies.  It  does  not  tend  to  eliminate  current  account  deficits  or  surpluses;  exchange  rate 
fluctuations  do  not  lead  to  movements  toward  balanced  trade,  nor  do  they  appear  to  follow 
from  flows  of  international  reserves:  some  countries  run  persistent  surpluses  while  others  run 
persistent  deficits. 
This  paper  first  examines  the  functioning  of  the  modern  international  financial  system 
in  order  to  design  a reformed  system  that  will  make  it  easier  to  deal  with  some  of  the 
problems  that  face  the  international  financial  system  today.  The  paper  advocates  reformation 
of  the  international  financial  system  along  the  lines  of  Keynes’s  famous  bancor  proposal. 
Most  importantly,  the  reform  would  eliminate  the  current  bias  toward  “austerity”  that  results 
from  the  way  in  which  existing  international  financial  institutions  operate. INTRODUCTION 
The  international  financial  system  might  be said  to be  in crisis.  It requires  frequent 
intervention  by  central  banks  and  other  national  and  international  bodies  to reduce 
fluctuations  of  currencies.  It does  not  tend  to  eliminate  current  account  deficits  or 
surpluses;  exchange  rate  fluctuations  do  not  lead  to  movements  toward  balanced 
trade,  nor  do  they  appear  to  follow  from  flows  of  international  reserves:  some 
countries  (notably  West  Germany  and  Japan)  run  persistent  surpluses  while  others 
(notably,  the  U.S.)  run  persistent  (even  rising)  deficits.  Nor  does  “free”  trade 
appear  to  operate  according  to  the  Ricardian  Law  of  Comparative  Advantage. 
“Free”  international  credit  markets  do  not  appear  to  provide  credit  in  a  socially 
acceptable  manner--some  countries  and  activities  appear  to  receive  far  too  much, 
while  others  receive  too  little.  The  world  is  experiencing  nearly  universal 
stagnation  while  governments  appear  to  be  unwilling,  perhaps  unable,  to  do 
anything  about  it. 
Before  moving  on  to  our  primary  concern,  this  paper  will  briefly  present 
the  orthodox  view  of  “money”--both  at  the  national  level  and  at  the  international 
level.  In  this  view,  money  is primarily  a medium  of  exchange  that  facilitates  the 
circulation  of  goods  either  domestically  or  internationally.  Accordingly,  domestic 
monetary  policy  should  be  concerned  primarily  with  control  over  the  money 
supply  in order  to  minimize  inflation.  On  this  view,  international  monetary  policy should  be  devoted  to  removing  barriers  to  free  capital  flows  and  to  maintenance 
of  freely  floating  exchange  rates.  Flexible  exchange  rates  are  said  to  permit 
independence  of  domestic  policy  from  international  considerations;  they  also 
ensure  rapid  adjustment  of  international  balance  sheets  to  equilibrium. 
We  next  examine  the  Post  Keynesian  view  of  money.  This  will  require  a 
brief  excursion  into  monetary  history  to make  it clear  that  money  was,  and  is, first 
and  foremost  a  unit  of  account.  This  helps  to  clarify  the  nature  of  various 
manifestations  of  money:  credit  money,  commodity  money,  and  reserve  money. 
We  can  then  move  to  an  understanding  of  the  functioning  of  the  modern 
international  financial  system;  this  will  allow  us  to  design  a reformed  system  that 
will  make  it  easier  to  deal  with  some  of  the  previously  discussed  problems  that 
face  the  international  financial  system  today. 
Finally,  this  paper  will  advocate  reformation  of  the  international  financial 
system  along  the  lines  of  Keynes’s  famous  bancor  proposal.  However,  it  will  be 
argued  that  Keynes’s  theoretical  justification  of  his  proposal  was  flawed.  Using 
Post  Keynesian  theory,  this  paper  will  provide  a justification  for reform  that  is free 
from  the  flaws  of  Keynes’s  argument. 
2 THE  ORTHODOX  VIEW  OF  DOMESTIC  AND  INTERNATIONAL  MONEY 
Let  me  begin  with  a quote  from  Samuelson;  this  is very  similar  to  the  exposition 
in  every  money  and  banking  book  with  which  I am  familiar.  It is also  historically 
incorrect  and  logically  flawed. 
Inconvenient  as barter  obviously  is, it represents  a great  step  forward  from 
a state  of  self-sufficiency  in which  every  man  had  to be  a jack-of-all-trades 
and  master  of  none....If  we  were  to  construct  history  along  hypothetical, 
logical  lines,  we  should  naturally  follow  the  age  of  barter  by  the  age  of 
commodity  money.  Historically,  a great  variety  of  commodities  has  served 
at one  time  or another  as a medium  of  exchange:  .  ..tobacco.  furs,  slaves  or 
wives...huge  rocks  and  landmarks,  and  cigarette  butts.  The  age  of 
commodity  money  gives  way  to  the  age  of  paper  money....  Finally,  along 
with  the  age  of  paper  money,  there  is  the  age  of  bank  money,  or  bank 
checking  deposits.  (Samuelson  1973 : 274-6) 
As  we  all know,  the  orthodox  story  begins  with  a barter  economy,  which  discovers 
that  money  can  be used  to lubricate  the  market  mechanism.  While  the  first  moneys 
are  Samuelson’s  “furs,  slaves,  or wives”  and  so on,  it is eventually  discovered  that 
precious  metals  serve  as  better  media  of  exchange  (scarcity  and  physical 
characteristics  ensure  their  value  is  high  relative  to  carrying  cost;  and  gold  is 
3 probably  less  likely  to  run  off  than  are  wives  when  used  as  media  of  exchange). 
Transactions  costs  are  further  reduced  when  the  goldsmith  accepts  deposits  of 
gold,  issuing  paper  money  backed  by  gold  reserves.  The  quantity  of  gold  reserves 
closely  governs  the  amount  of  paper  money  issued  so  that  redeemability  is 
ensured. 
Eventually,  government  fiat  money  somehow  becomes  the  reserve  held  by 
banks  against  deposits,  but  this  doesn’t  change  anything:  the  quantity  of  money 
is  still  determined  by  reserves.  Since  the  central  bank  determines  the  quantity  of 
reserves,  it controls  the  money  supply.  If it supplies  too  many  reserves,  the  money 
supply  increases  too  fast,  causing  inflation.  Thus,  according  to  orthodox 
economists,  money  policy  should  control  reserves  in order  to control  inflation:  the 
primary  domestic  responsibility  of  the  central  bank  is  to  serve  as  an  inflation 
guard  dog. 
The  orthodox  view  of  international  money  is similarly  based  on  the  barter 
paradigm.  As  Hahn  says,  “The  pure  theory  of  International  Trade  pays  no  regard 
to  financial  matters  and  deals  with  non-mediated  exchange  of  regions...”  (Hahn 
199 1: 1) In  a simple,  moneyless,  model,  the  addition  of  “foreign  countries”  would 
not  complicate  the  analysis;  each  country  could  be  treated  as an  optimizing  agent 
such  that  an  equilibrium  vector  of  relative  prices  would  emerge  from  barter.  If 
production  is  added,  countries  would  specialize  according  to  the  Ricardian  Law 
4 of  Comparative  Advantage,  with  each  taking  advantage  of  its  unique  national 
environment.  (Davidson  1992,  p.  116) If equilibrium  were  stable,  then  the  process 
of  tatonnement  would  generate  an  equilibrium  vector  of  relative  prices  in 
accordance  with  technologies  and  tastes.  ’ 
“Free”  trade  among  countries  is believed  to  increase  economic  efficiency 
just  as  “free”  trade  within  a country  would  do  so.  In  the  absence  of  money  and 
historical  time,  international  trade  would  always  be  “balanced”--with  all  trades 
executed  at  an  instant  of  logical  time,  each  purchase  of  a time-dated  commodity 
by  Country  A  would  be  offset  by  a time-dated  commodity  sale  by  Country  A.  A 
trade  deficit  would  be  impossible,  as  “Each  region  is  at  all  times  taken  to  be  in 
Walrasian  equilibrium”.  (Hahn  199 1:  1) 
Things  become  more  complicated  once  we  allow  for  the  use  of  money  as 
a  medium  of  exchange.  Of  course,  as  recognized  by  Hahn  (1983),  General 
Equilibrium  Theory  (GET)  has  no  room  for  money  but,  like  the  orthodox 
economists,  we  will  ignore  that  problem  for  now.  Once  money  is  allowed,  we 
must  specify  whether  our  international  economy  operates  with  a  unified  money 
system  (UMS)  or  a  nonunified  money  system  (NUMS).  (Davidson  1992)  A 
unified  money  system  is one  in which  all nations  either  use  the  same  money  unit, 
or  one  in  which  different  money  units  are  used  but  in  which  the  exchange  rates 
among  the  different  money  units  are  stable  and  are  expected  to  remain  so.  (It  is 
5 not  necessary  that  the  exchange  rates  are  fixed;  it  is  only  necessary  that 
movements  are  perfectly  foreseen.)  A  nonunified  money  system  is  one  in  which 
a number  of monetary  units  are used  and  in which  exchange  rates  are not  expected 
to  be  stable.  It  is  the  NUMS  that  causes  the  greatest  problems  for  Neoclassical 
theory  (and  for  real  world  stability). 
Assuming  a UMS  operating  in historical  time,  a trade  deficit  now  becomes 
possible:  country  A  can  import  more  commodities  than  it  exports,  leading  to  an 
outflow  of  the  currency  of  A.  Agents  of  country  B  will  accept  this  currency, 
knowing  the  rate  at which  it will  exchange  against  currency  B. However,  assuming 
that  these  currencies  are  indeed  different  and  that  currency  A will  not  be  accepted 
as  legal  tender  in  country  B,  then  the  agents  of  B will  hold  this  currency  only  on 
the  expectation  that  it will  be  used  later  to buy  the  exports  of  A.  If  this  is not  the 
case,  the  currency  of  A  will  have  to  be  converted  into  the  currency  of  B;  this 
might  be  accomplished  by profit-seeking  agents  specializing  in currency  exchange 
(who  charge  a  small  fee  for  the  service).  These  currency  exchanges  would  have 
to  keep  reserves  of  a variety  of  currencies  in  order  to  accomplish  conversions  for 
the  currencies  of  a variety  of  trading  partners;  these  “capital”  reserves  would  have 
to  earn  a normal  return  obtained  through  the  fees. 
In  general  equilibrium  theory,  a gold  standard  is normally  assumed;  in this 
case,  each  currency  is made  convertible  into  gold.  Gold  can  operate  as the  single 
6 reserve,  reducing  the  required  reserves  of  the  currency  exchanges,  resulting  in 
efficiency  gains.  The  currency  of  any  country  would  be  increased  whenever  a 
trade  surplus  led  to an inflow  of gold  reserves;  on  the  other  hand,  a country  facing 
a trade  deficit  would  lose  gold  reserves,  destroying  a portion  of  the  supply  of  its 
currency.  Seignorage  would  replace  fees  as  a  “central  bank”  with  the  power  to 
issue  currency  based  on  gold  reserves  replaced  currency  exchanges.  As  Hahn 
argues,  addition  of  (UMS)  money  under  a gold  standard  to GE  theory  leads  to  “no 
changes  in  the  ‘real’  equilibrium  conditions,  that  is  the  equilibrium  terms  of 
trade”.  (Hahn  199 1:  1)  Just  as  money  is neutral  in  the  domestic  economy,  in  the 
UMS  case,  it  is  neutral  in  the  international  economy. 
The  specie-flow  mechanism  is  supposed  to  quickly  rectify  a  trade 
imbalance:  the  deficit  country  would  lose  gold  reserves  and  its  money  supply 
would  shrink;  the  prices  of  its  commodities  would  fall  due  to  the  loss  of 
purchasing  power  of  its  citizens,  attributed  to  a  loss  of  wealth  (as  the  money 
supply  shrinks);  as  its  prices  fell  relatively  to  those  of  competitor  nations,  its 
exports  would  rise;  at  the  same  time,  its  imports  would  fall  due  to  falling  wealth 
of  its citizens.  No  country  could  maintain  a trade  deficit  indefinitely  for  the  simple 
reason  that  it  would  eventually  run  out  of  gold  reserves;  before  this  point  is 
reached,  it would  have  to depreciate  the  currency,  making  imports  more  expensive 
and  exports  cheaper.  Indeed,  a  flexible  exchange  rate,  according  to  the  logic  of 
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However,  a freely  flexible  exchange  rate  conflicts  with  the  conditions  required  to 
operate  a  UMS--a  flexible  exchange  rate  system  could  be  a  UMS  only  if  the 
exchange  rate  did  not  move  much,  and  was  not  expected  to  move  much. 
On  the  other  hand,  a  freely  flexible  exchange  rate  is  consistent  with  a 
NUMS.  Here,  while  all  currencies  may  be  freely  convertible  into  a gold  reserve, 
exchange  rates  are  (or  are  expected  to  be)  free  to  adjust  to  eliminate  trade 
imbalances.  According  to the  Efficient  Market  Hypothesis,  laissez  faire  will  again 
establish  an  equilibrium  price  vector  that  includes  a  relative  price  for  each 
currency;  the  central  bank  would  merely  stand  ready  to  exchange  gold  reserves  for 
the  domestic  currency  on  demand.  It is believed  that  this  will  promote  stability  of 
the  NUMS. 
Under  a  NUMS,  a  trade  deficit  forces  a  devaluation  to  protect  gold 
reserves.  This  then  works  “via  the  real  cash  balance  effect”  to  lower  domestic 
spending  until  the  trade  deficit  is eliminated.  (Hahn  199 1:  1)  According  to  Hahn, 
a  “variable  exchange  rate  is  an  ideal  (although  imperfect)  substitute”  to  perfectly 
flexible  domestic  prices.  (Hahn  1991:  6)  For  example,  assume  that  wages  and 
prices  are rigid  in an economy  which  is subjected  to a negative  productivity  shock. 
If  exchange  rates  are  fixed,  this  economy  can  adjust  to the  shock  only  by  lowering 
employment  and  real  income;  if exchange  rates  are  flexible,  however,  adjustment 
8 is made  through  depreciation  that  lowers  domestic  prices  relative  to foreign  prices. 
Thus,  the  flexible  exchange  rate  regime  is believed  to  allow  adjustment  to  shocks 
without  adverse  employment  effects  even  if  domestic  prices  are  not  flexible.  In 
this  sense,  flexible  exchange  rates  are  seen  as  a  substitute  for  flexible  domestic 
prices,  and  thus  increase  flexibility  of  a market  economy  to  speed  adjustment  to 
equilibrium. 
A  flexible  exchange  rate  system  generates  uncertainty  about  the  exchange 
rate.  However,  Hahn  argues  that  “uncertainty”  over  exchange  rates  only  replaces 
“uncertainty”  over  employment  levels--because  the  fixed  exchange  rate  system 
would  use  unemployment  as  the  method  for  adapting  to  rigid  wages.  He  thus 
argues  that  a flexible  exchange  rate  system  is preferred  over  a fixed  exchange  rate 
system  in  the  “real  world”  where  wages  are  not  perfectly  flexible. 
In  sum,  orthodox  economists  can  accept  either  an  international  gold 
standard  in  which  the  specie-flow  mechanism  leads  to  movement  toward  trade 
balance,  or  a  flexible  exchange  rate  system  in  which  fluctuating  values  of 
currencies  rectify  trade  imbalances.  In  either  case,  the  focus  is  on  real  variables 
and  money  only  lubricates  the  market  system.  In  either  case,  money  is neutral  (at 
least  in  the  long  run)  but  has  not  been  successfully  introduced  into  any  rigorous 
neoclassical  model.  Freely  flexible  prices  (including  the  “price”  of  the  domestic 
currency  in  terms  of  foreign  currencies)  are  supposed  to  lead  to  a  general 
9 equilibrium  (although  this  has  never  been  shown  for  a  model  with  money). 
Although  it  is  admitted  that  a  flexible  exchange  rate  system  will  generate 
speculation,  this  is  believed  to  be  stabilizing  (again,  this  has  never  been  shown 
rigorously),  and  can  even  offset  some  degree  of  rigidity  in  domestic  markets. 
Orthodox  domestic  policy  is reduced  to guarding  against  inflation  through 
purported  control  over  the  domestic  money  supply  (although  the  experience  of  the 
1980s  has  cast  considerable  doubt  among  orthodox  economists  that  the  central 
bank  can  control  the  money  supply--doubters  have  tended  to  call  for  direct  control 
over  inflation,  but  have  been  unable  to  get  beyond  pure  mysticism  regarding  how 
the  central  bank  is  to  accomplish  this).  Orthodox  international  policy  is  reduced 
to  hand  waves  concerning  efficient  international  allocations  through  free  markets 
with  a UMS  or  NUMS;  the  latter  is  believed  to  impart  greater  flexibility. 
A  POST  KEYNESIAN  VIEW  OF  MONEY 
As  discussed,  the  orthodox  view  of  money  (whether  national  or  international) 
begins  with  barter  and  with  money  lubricating  trade  as  a  medium  of  exchange. 
While  it  is  true  that  all  orthodox  economists  would  also  admit  a role  for  money 
as  a  store  of  value,  as  Keynes  remarked,  only  a  lunatic  would  hold  money  for 
such  purposes  in  the  Neoclassical  world.  This  is  because  uncertainty  of  the 
10 Keynesian  variety  is  ruled  out  of  existence  by  Neoclassical  assumptions.  In  this 
section,  we  will  relate  the  use  of  money  to uncertainty  and  to private  property;  in 
such  an  environment,  money  is  first  and  foremost  a  unit  of  account--or,  as 
Davidson  (1990)  argues,  as  the  terms  in  which  private  contracts  are  written. 
Money  is  then  closely  associated  with  the  means  of  contractual  settlement,  with 
the  universally  recognized  measure  of  wealth,  and  with  the  form  in  which  wealth 
is  stored.  This  is not  to  deny  the  importance  of  the  medium  of  exchange  function 
of  money,  but  an  understanding  of  the  origins  of  money  will  help  to  make  the 
nature  of  money  clear.  This  will  help  us  to  understand  the  international  money 
system  so  that  we  can  reform  it. 
We  will  first  go  through  a reconstruction  of  the  history  of  money  and  the 
development  of  our  modern  financial  system.  My  view  can  be  summarized  as: 
1. primitive  barter  did  not  lead  to  the  development  of  market  exchange; 
2.  money  did  not  develop  out  of  barter; 
3. credit  money  predated  commodity  money  and  government  money--credit 
money  comes  first; 
4.  and  the  quantity  of  credit  money  has  never  been  constrained  by  the 
quantity  of  gold  or  government  money  reserves. 
11 Space  constraints  prohibit  a  full  development  of  each  of  these  points;  a  full 
treatment  with  citations  can  be  found  in Wray  (1993A).  I will  only  summarize  the 
major  points  presented  there. 
Let’s  begin  with  the  barter  story.  Orthodoxy  imagines  a market  economy 
that  predates  money;  that  is,  a market  based  on  barter.  This  is neither  historically 
accurate,  nor  is  it  logical.  The  orthodox  economist  and  historian  claim  to  find 
barter  in  tribal  societies.  I will  argue  that  exchange  may  occur  in  tribal  societies, 
but  it  cannot  lead  to  markets  nor  to  the  use  of  money:  tribal  exchange  is  not 
markets  based  on  barter,  but  is  very  different  from  market  exchange, 
For  example,  Polanyi  argues  that  the  exchanges  which  occur  in  tribal 
societies  are  “public  acts  performed  in  regard  to  the  status  of  persons  and  other 
self-propelling  things.  .  . ”  [Polanyi  1971,  p.  751 According  to  Malinowski,  these 
exchanges  have  as  their  main  aim  to  “exchange  articles  which  are  of  no  practical 
use...”  [Malinowski  1932,  p.  861; indeed,  Polanyi  says  that  often  “the  identically 
same  object  is  exchanged  back  and  forth  between  the  partners...the  sole  purpose 
of  the  exchange  is  to  draw  relationships  closer  by  strengthening  the  ties  of 
reciprocity”  [Polanyi  197 1, p.  741 Furthermore,  exchanges  were  frequently  made 
to  equalize  wealth,  rather  than  to  achieve  mutually  beneficial  allocations  of 
resources.  (Heinsohn  and  Steiger  (1983;  1989)  In  tribal  society,  all  exchanges 
were  determined  by  custom.  There  was  generally  no  fixed  exchange  rate  among 
12 exchanged  goods--the  exchange  rates  would  depend  upon  the  status  of  the  parties 
to  the  exchange;  and  the  so-called  primitive  monies  we  observe  in  tribal  society 
(Samuelson’s  landmarks,  rocks,  seashells)  are  never  used  as  a unit  of  account  to 
compare  the  value  of  different  items--there  are  no  free  exchanges  so  there  is  no 
need  for  a unit  of  account  to  measure  the  terms  of  exchange. 
Nor  are  the  primitive  moneys  ever  used  as  a  unit  of  account  to  measure 
debts;  there  are  never  any  deferred  payments,  so  there  is  no  reason  to  have  a 
measure  of  how  much  one  would  pay  later.  In  fact,  in primitive  society,  there  are 
no  loans  in  the  modern  sense  of  the  term.  Loans  today  are  always  initiated  by  the 
borrower  and  money  is  used  as  the  measure  of  how  much  has  to  be  repaid  later. 
If  an  individual  fails  to  repay  the  loan,  h/she  is  subject  to  sanctions.  But  in 
primitive  society,  loans  are  always  forced  by  the  lender  onto  the  “debtor”.  They 
will  be  repaid  through  a very  specific  action,  with  repayment  terms  fixed  by  social 
norms  of reciprocity--there  is no private  negotiation  over  the  terms--and  the  lender 
does  not  expect  to  receive  any  economic  gain  from  the  loan;  the  loan  is 
undertaken  to  destroy  his/her  wealth,  not  to  increase  it,  while  building  ties  of 
reciprocity. 
Finally,  the  “monies”  are  always  special  purpose--one  trades  a  specific 
object  only  in  a very  specific  social  setting.  For  example,  a necklace  of  sea  shells 
is presented  to  the  family  of  the  bride.  This  does  not  mean  that  a wife  is worth  a 
13 necklace;  it  does  not  mean  that  either  wives  or  necklaces  are  money;  obviously, 
the  family  certainly  doesn’t  view  the  woman  as  money  to  be  used  to  buy 
necklaces.  It  merely  means  that  the  primitive  valuable,  a  necklace,  is  the 
appropriate  gift  in  marriage.  (Dalton  1982)  One  can’t  substitute  something  else; 
and  one  never  uses  the  necklace  in another  social  interaction:  necklaces  are  always 
for  marriage  and  never  for  “generalized  exchanges”. 
Clearly,  primitive  exchanges  do  not  conform  to  the  orthodox  view  of 
profit-seeking  market  behavior,  but  represent  conventional  behavior  (that  is, 
socially  and  culturally  established  norms  of  behavior)  similar  to  the  Western 
practice  of  gift-giving  at  Christmas.  Then  what  are  the  primitive  monies  cited  in 
Samuelson’s  story?  What  is  the  exchange,  if  it  is  not  an  economic  exchange 
designed  to  maximize  individual  wealth?  The  primitive  exchange  of  “monies”-- 
primitive  valuables  is  a  better  term--really  was  designed  to  reproduce  tribal 
society,  to bring  people  closer  together  through  social  rituals.  Tribal  exchanges  did 
not  lead  to  the  development  of  the  use  of  money;  nor  to  the  development  of 
markets.  There  is  no  reason  to  try  to  maximize  wealth  in  tribal  exchanges; 
everyone  is  taken  care  of  to  the  best  of  the  ability  of  the  tribe. 
The  institution  of  private  property  is a prerequisite  to  the  development  of 
monetary  production,  that  is, production  for  sale  in markets  for  money  to generate 
profits.  (Heinsohn  and  Steiger  1983,  1989)  The  development  of  private  property 
14 destroys  the  collective  security  of  tribal  or  command  society  and  generates 
“existential  uncertainty”--each  member  of  society  becomes  responsible  for  his/her 
own  security.  Each  individual  household  tries  to build  up  a surplus  (mainly  in the 
form  of  grain  reserves)  to  get  through  bad  times.  The  development  of  private 
property  leads  to  the  possibility  of  loans,  and  to  the  creation  of  propertyless 
individuals.  If  an  individual  household  finds  it was  not  able  to produce  enough  to 
survive,  it must  borrow  some  of  the  surplus  reserves  of  another  household.  When 
private  loans  are  made,  the  lender  gives  up  private  property  in  exchange  for  an 
IOU  issued  by  the  debtor,  which  represents  a  forward  contract. 
This  private  contract  must  include  an  interest  premium,  the  size  of  which 
is  determined  by  the  estimate  of  the  existential  uncertainty  faced  by  the  lender 
regarding  the  possibility  that  the  lender  might  need  the  loaned  property  before 
payment  is  due.2  Thus,  all  forward  contracts  involve  “wheat  now  for  more  wheat 
later”  propositions,  which  are  monetary  propositions.  The  earliest  loans  were  in- 
kind  loans:  a  bushel  of  wheat  for  2  bushels  later,  and  so  on.  In  the  beginning, 
interest  could  be  paid  out  of  the  natural  fecundity  of  the  loaned  grain--  I borrow 
a bushel  now,  and  repay  2 bushels  at  the  end  of  the  growing  season. 
But  eventually,  repayment  terms  became  standardized  in wheat  terms.  (As 
Keynes  discovered,  the  early  money  of account  was  kept  in terms  of  wheat  units.) 
Temples  played  a role  in  standardizing  the  terms--that  is,  in  development  of  the 
1.5 money  of  account.  The  creditor  and  debtor  needed  a  neutral  witness  to  (and 
enforcer  of)  the  contract  (there  was  no  writing).  Later,  writing  was  invented  in the 
temples  to  keep  track  of  debt  contracts  and  the  tribute  that  each  household  had  to 
pay  to  the  temple.  The  temple  would  receive  payment  in  kind  for  the  tribute  and 
for  witnessing  contracts.  It  also  began  to  act  as  a  depository  for  the  creditors: 
when  a borrower  repaid  a loan,  the  temple  would  hold  it  for  safekeeping  for  the 
creditors.  Hence,  temples  accumulated  large  stocks  of  grain  and  animals.  To 
reduce  storage  costs,  the  temples  encouraged  the  development  of  a  standard  unit 
of  account--at  first  wheat  because  its  storage  costs  were  lower  and  because  it was 
fairly  uniform  in  size;  but  later  barley  because  it was  even  more  uniform.  All  the 
early  units  of  account  were  weight  units  based  on  the  number  of  wheat  or  barley 
grains.  For  example,  the  early  money  of  account  used  in Babylonia  was  the  mina, 
equal  in  weight  to  10,800  grains  of  wheat.  The  weight  units  pre-existed  money; 
they  were  already  used  to  measure  tribute  paid  to  temples  and  they  were  adopted 
as  the  unit  of  account  in  which  debts  were  measured.  Later,  the  temple  would 
issue  a  piece  of  metal  that  weighed  the  same  amount  as  the  number  of  barley 
grains  it represented,  with  a stamp  to show  the  value.  These  stamped  metals  would 
merely  represent  the  temple’s  IOU,  measured  in  the  wheat  or  barley  unit  of 
account.  When  a creditor  wanted  to withdraw  a portion  of his/her  deposit  from  the 
temple,  transactions  costs  were  reduced  by  giving  stamped  metal  rather  than 
16 counting  out  the  grains  of  wheat.  The  metal  was  then  used  in private  transactions 
(as  a means  of payment--or  means  of  contractual  settlement)  or to pay  tribute,  but 
its  value  was  determined  by  weight  in  terms  of  the  number  of  barley  grains  it 
represented--again  (like  the  transition  from  wheat  to  barley  grains),  this  was  a 
technical  advance  that  did  not  change  the  nature  of  money. 
Thus,  the  first  money  was  created  as  part  of  a  forward  contract  that 
involved  “wheat  now,  for  more  wheat  later”.  As  the  terms  became  standardized, 
we  have  the  creation  of  a  money  unit  of  account.  The  temples  did  not  create 
money;  and  money  was  not  first  in  the  form  of  precious  metals.  Instead,  money 
was  privately  created;  the  temples  only  played  a role  in the  technical  evolution  of 
money.  The  use  of precious  metals  as money-denominated  assets  comes  later;  and 
the  primary  reason  is not  that  gold  is inherently  valuable,  but  because  it would  be 
difficult  to  counterfeit.  Even  when  gold  was  first  used,  its  value  was  still 
determined  by  its  weight  equivalent  to  the  barley  unit  of  account.  Once  there 
existed  a  universal  unit  of  account  and  a  method  for  witnessing  and  recording 
private  contracts,  then  privately  issued  credit  money  (a  privately-issued,  money- 
denominated  liability--see  the  next  section)  could  circulate  among  third  parties.  It 
could  function  as  a  means  of  payment,  retiring  private  debt  commitments,  and 
even  perhaps  in paying  tribute  to the  temples.  So money  is first  a unit  of  account, 
17 and  then  a  means  of  payment;  it  does  not  start  as  a  medium  of  exchange.  In 
conclusion,  money  came  before  markets--it  got  its  start  in  private  loan  contracts. 
Now  of  course  we  don’t  have  written  records  to  prove  this.  The  earliest 
writing  does  seem  to be records  of debt  contracts;  and  all early  monetary  units  are 
weight  units,  always  in  terms  of  a  specific  number  of  grains  of  wheat  or  barley. 
This  is true  for  the  mina,  and  the  shekel;  but  it is also  true  for  the  unit  of  account 
used  everywhere  in  europe:  the  pound.  Whether  it  is  the  Roman  pound,  or  the 
Italian  lira,  or  the  French  livre,  or  the  Milanese  ducatoon,  the  early  money  of 
account  was  always  a weight  unit.  This  is not  quite  so  controversial  as  it  sounds 
at first.  Historians  have  long  written  about  the  ghost  money,  or  imaginary  money, 
of  Europe  that  lasted  from  the  time  of  Charlemagne  through  the  middle  ages. 
There  was  always  an  attempt  to  write  debt  contracts  in  an  imaginary  pound  unit 
of  account,  even  though  there  often  was  no  equivalent  coined  unit. 
The  historians  have  usually  attributed  this  to  confusion  or  illusion.  They 
think  it  is  strange,  for  example,  to  write  a debt  contract  in  terms  of  a pound  unit 
of  account,  when  there  are  no  pound  coins.  Typically,  the  only  coins  were 
shillings;  and  over  time,  the  shillings  would  decline  in  value  so  that  it took  more 
and  more  of  them  to  equal  a  pound  unit  of  account.  But  this  was  neither 
confusion,  nor  was  it  anything  new.  The  money  of  account  had  always  been  a 
weight  unit,  and  it  is  entirely  irrelevant  whether  there  is  a coin  of  the  same  unit. 
18 I’11 examine  coining  later,  but  money  is not  the  same  thing  as  coins;  or,  coins  are 
not  money.  The  historian’s  confusion  arises  from  identifying  coin  as  money,  and 
from  emphasizing  the  medium  exchange  function  of  money.  If  one  instead 
recognizes  the  fundamental  importance  of  the  unit  of  account  in  any  private 
property  economy  operating  in  historical  time,  the  confusion  disappears.3 
Let’s  return  to  the  orthodox  belief  that  markets  existed  before  money  was 
invented.  However,  markets  cannot  predate  money  because  independence  of 
individuals  and  private  property  must  exist  before  markets.  In  a  tribal  society, 
there  is no  sense  in producing  things  you  don’t  need  for  the  market  in order  to  get 
things  you  do  need.  In  tribal  society,  all  needs  are  already  met  to  the  best  of  the 
tribe’s  ability  to  do  so.  But  as  I  argued,  once  you  have  private  property  and 
independence,  you  already  have  the  conditions  required  for  the  existence  of 
money:  the  possibility  of  loans  and  the  existence  of uncertainty.  The  market  is not 
a  place  for  getting  things  you  need;  it  is  a  place  where  you  earn  the  means  of 
retiring  debt  (or,  means  of  contractual  settlement)--that  is,  money.  From  the 
beginning,  production  for  markets  was  production  to  obtain  money--and  not  to 
barter  for  needed  commodities.  The  barter  economy  is  merely  a  hypothesis 
obtained  by  neoclassical  economists  who  take  our  economy,  then  drop  money  and 
analyze  it  as  if  it  were  a barter  economy;  then  they  add  money  back  in  as  if  it 
came  from  helicopters.  But  this  leads  to  a  view  of  money  that  is  completely 
19 wrong,  and  leads  to incorrect  conclusions  about  appropriate  monetary  policy.  Let’s 
look  in  more  detail  at  a money  economy  like  ours. 
In  a  monetary  economy,  production  occurs  not  to  satisfy  “needs”,  but  to 
satisfy  the  desire  to  accumulate  wealth  in  money  form.  Production  is  not 
undertaken  by  a  Robinson  Crusoe  type  agent  who  is  both  a  producer  and 
consumer;  instead,  there  are  those  who  own  private  property,  and  those  who  do 
not--and  so must  work  for  wages.  However,  the  existence  of propertyless  workers 
extends  market  demand,  and  extends  the  use  of  money  as a medium  of  exchange. 
Unlike  production  in,  say,  a  tribal  society,  capitalist  production  always  involves 
money.  The  capitalist  must  hire  workers  to produce  the  goods  that  will  be  sold  on 
markets.  As production  takes  time,  the  capitalist  must  pay  wages  now,  before  sales 
receipts  are  realized.  Furthermore,  because  the  future  is  uncertain,  sales  receipts 
are  uncertain.  This  means  that  interest  must  be  paid  on  liabilities  and  that 
capitalist  production  is  only  undertaken  on  the  expectation  of  making  pro&s. 
Thus,  capitalist  production  always  involves  “money  now,  for  more  money  later”. 
Since  money  contracts  always  include  interest,  and  because  contracts 
always  are  of  the  nature  of  money  now  for  more  money  later,  this  means  that 
monetary  contracts  will  always  grow  over  time  at a rate  determined  in part  by  the 
rate  of  interest.  (Wray  1993B)  This  generates  a  logic  of  accumulation:  all 
monetary  economies  must  grow.  If they  do  not,  accumulation  falters  and  nominal 
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economic  growth.  It  cannot  be  constrained  by  a  fixed  money  supply,  nor  by  a 
commodity  money  whose  quantity  expands  only  upon  new  discoveries.  That  is, 
the  money-of-account  supply  is  determined  in  the  private  contracts  between 
debtors  and  creditors;  the  quantity  of  wheat-money-of-account  can  never  be 
constrained  by  the  quantity  of  wheat  in  existence.  Rather,  the  quantity  of  wheat 
money  created  in contracts  is constrained  by  the  perceived  ability  of  the  borrower 
to  deliver  “more  (wheat  denominated)  money”  later.  This  leads  directly  to  what 
is  called  the  endogenous  money  approach--money  has  always  been  endogenous, 
with  its quantity  determined  in debt  contracts  denominated  in money  terms  (or,  the 
unit  of account).  The  same  principles  hold  regardless  of the  money  unit  of account 
chosen  (whether  it  is  the  dollar  or  the  yen),  and  regardless  of  the  medium  of 
exchange  used  (bank  notes,  bank  deposits,  gold  coin,  or  “fiat”  currency),  which 
would  be  denominated  in  the  money  of  account. 
In  order  to  enhance  the  ability  of  privately  created  money  to  circulate, 
IOUs  would  be  “accepted”  by  trustworthy  individuals  or  institutions,  through  an 
endorsement  that  guaranteed  the  IOU.  At  first,  this  role  was  played  by  the 
temples,  but  later,  a wide  variety  of  institutions  and  individuals  could  perform  the 
role,  ranging  from  governments  to  merchants,  to  respected  and  usually  wealthy 
individuals,  and  to  banks.  A  good  example  of  such  a private  IOU  was  the  bill  of 
21 exchange;  indeed,  this  was  by  far  the  most  important  money-denominated  asset 
used  as a medium  of  exchange  and  means  of payment  from  the  middle  ages  right 
up  to  the  19th  century.  It  would  circulate  upon  endorsement;  in  fact,  if  it  was 
endorsed  by  a bank,  it was  called  a gilt-edge,  meaning,  it was  supposed  to  be  as 
good  as  gold.  But  it  wasn’t  quite.  This  brings  us  to  the  primary  problem  of 
privately  created  money:  its  issuer  might  default.  If  the  issuer  defaults,  creditors 
go  after  the  endorsers--but  they  can  default  too.  So  to  increase  the  ability  of 
private  IOUs  to  circulate,  these  would  be  made  convertible  into  other  media  of 
exchange,  such  as the  precious-metal-wheat-denominated  bars  issued  by  temples. 
Finally,  after  the  development  of  stamped  coins,  private  liabilities  could  be  made 
convertible  into  currency. 
Thus,  we  finally  arrive  at the  “goldsmith”  stage,  at which  orthodox  theory 
begins,  with  a commodity  money  (gold)  that  is deposited  with  the  goldsmith,  who 
discovers  the  “deposit  expansion  process”.  Actually,  the process  worked  in reverse. 
A  commodity  money  could  not  have  developed  before  the  development  of  a 
money  of  account--which  is  necessarily  the  result  of  private  debt  contracts.  The 
commodity  money  is  developed  for  technical  reasons,  but  becomes  the  reserve 
money  because  privately  issued  credit  money  is  subject  to  default  risk.  It  is  not 
that  deposits  of commodity  money  make  loans  and  credit  money;  rather,  loans  and 
credit  money  generate  a  desire  to  hold  small  reserves  of  commodity  money  in 
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money.  Money  is the  socially  determined  unit  of  account;  it is  wheat  money,  lira 
money,  or  dollar  money.  But,  all privately  issued  money  has  at least  some  risk  of 
default,  and  to  make  this  risk  palatable,  privately  issued  credit  money  is  made 
convertible  into  other  money-denominated  liabilities.  The  commodity  money  is the 
risk-free  representation  of  the  social  measure  of  value;  as  such,  it is chosen  as the 
“ultimate”  backing  for  privately  issued  money.  However,  the  quantity  of 
commodity  money  available  never  constrains  the  money  of  account  supply.  This 
means  that  wholesale  conversion  (“liquidation”)  of  private  IOUs  can  never  be 
accomplished  in  the  aggregate.  That  is,  a  credit  money  economy  based  on  a 
commodity  money  reserve  collapses  if  there  are  attempts  at  conversion. 
In  all private  property  economies,  money  is characteristically  a promise  to 
pay.  A  pyramid  of  these  promises  evolves--each  backed  by  (or  made  convertible 
into)  a  promise  higher  in  the  pyramid.  The  rules  of  the  game  require  that  one 
discharqe  one’s  IOU  using  a third  party  IOU.  (No private  party  is able  to  issue  its 
own  means  of  payment  to  be  used  to  discharge  its  own  debt.)  Frequently,  it  is 
required  that  the  third  party  IOU  to  be  delivered  is  one  issued  by  a party  higher 
in  the  debt  pyramid.  For  example,  a  bill  of  exchange  liability  is  discharged 
through  delivery  of  a  bank  note;  a  bank  note  liability  is  discharged  through 
delivery  of  a  Bank  of  England  note;  the  Bank  of  England  note  liability  is 
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to  fulfill  certain  functions  associated  with  “money”  fulfill  &l functions;  some  serve 
as  general  media  of  exchange;  others  serve  as  means  of  payment  only  for  those 
lower  in the  debt  pyramid.  Over  time,  there  has  been  a continual  narrowing  of  the 
types  of  liabilities  that  will  circulate,  to  those  in  the  highest  reaches  of  the 
pyramid.  Thus,  the  financial  system  has  evolved  from  one  in which  a wide  variety 
of  types  of  liabilities  circulated  to  one  in  which  government  liabilities  and  the 
liabilities  of  banks  comprise  the  vast  majority  of  the  circulating  “money  supply”. 
Similarly,  there  has  been  a narrowing  of  the  liabilities  that  are  accepted  as means 
of  payment  that  discharge  liabilities,  although  this  narrowing  has  not  been  as 
pronounced  as  that  of  media  of  exchange. 
The  first  central  banks  were  created  (without  exception)  to  provide 
government  finance.  Governments  were  typically  very  constrained  in  their  ability 
to  borrow,  probably  because  it  was  not  healthy  to  be  a  creditor  of  a  king  in 
financial  difficulty.  Typically,  a  government  could  borrow  only  if  its  IOU  were 
backed  by  a respected  individual.  (This,  of  course,  is  much  different  than  today, 
when  government  guarantees  back  private  liabilities.)  The  crown  was  typically 
seen  as  the  least  credit  worthy  borrower;  it  could  borrow  only  with  private 
guarantees;  it usually  had  to pay  a much  higher  interest  rate  than  other  borrowers; 
and  crown  debts  were  almost  never  repaid.4  In  any  case,  governments  had  trouble 
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only  on  the  basis  of  the  amount  of  precious  metals  contained  in  it.  One  could  say 
that  the  whole  monetary  history  of  the  middle  ages  could  be  explained  as  an 
attempt  by  the  governments  to  either  find  gold  that  they  could  coin,  or  to  debase 
coin--trying  to  get  more  coins  out  of  their  gold.  Debasement  caused  the  value  of 
coins  to  fall continually  throughout  the  middle  ages--sometimes  very  rapidly.  This 
brings  us  back  to  the  ghost  money.  Orthodox  analysis  attributes  the  continual  loss 
of  the  value  of  government  coins  to  inflation  caused  by  “too  many”  coins  in 
circulation--money  causes  inflation.  In  reality,  it  is  not  that  too  much  money 
causes  inflation,  rather,  the  prices  of  commodities  actually  were  very  stable  in 
terms  of  the  ghost  money  of  account;  for  example,  in  terms  of  the  pound.  But 
because  government  coins  were  only  worth  as  much  as  the  gold  value  of  the 
coins,  debasement  would  increase  prices  in  terms  of  coin,  but  not  in  terms  of  the 
money  of  account.  Again,  this  is because  one  would  not  accept  government  debt-- 
a  debased  coin  is  really  government  debt,  so  it  falls  in  value  to  the  amount  of 
embodied  precious  metal. 
Private  institutions  did  issue  money-denominated  assets  that  were  stable  in 
value,  the  so-called  giro  monies.  As  long  as people  trusted  an  issuer  of  a liability, 
the  liability  could  remain  stable  in  terms  of  the  ghost  money;  so  private 
institutions  could  issue  fiat  money--that  is, IOUs  denominated  in pounds.  Because 
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power  by  debasing  coin  or  taking  gold,  its  liabilities  were  worthless  so  that 
government  money  circulated  only  at  the  value  of  embodied  precious  metals.  In 
fact,  the  Bank  of  England  was  founded  because  the  Crown  could  not  borrow  from 
private  lenders  to  finance  a war  with  France  as it had  recently  seized  gold  that  had 
been  deposited  for  safe-keeping.  Thus,  central  banks  were  created  to  buy 
government  debt  as  they  issued  their  own  notes.  This  development  essentially 
allowed  the  government  to  create  fiat  money:  central  bank  notes  could  be 
denominated  in  pounds--just  as  any  private  bank  notes  were  denominated  in 
pounds.5 
For  a  number  of  reasons,  central  banks  gradually  took  a  position  at  the 
apex  of  the  pyramid  of  liabilities.  In  the  case  of  England,  country  banks  used 
London  banks  as  their  reserve  banks,  so  pyramiding  on  London  was  already 
commonplace.  The  Bank  of  England  succeeded  in  passing  laws  to  outlaw  note 
issue  by  all  other  London  banks,  giving  it  a big  advantage.  Eventually,  London 
banks  made  their  liabilities  convertible  into  Bank  of  England  notes,  leading  to  the 
development  of a pyramid  based  on the Bank  of England.  Thus,  nonbank  liabilities 
would  be  made  convertible  into  bank  liabilities,  and  bank  liabilities  would  be 
made  convertible  into  central  bank  liabilities.  All  capitalist  countries  developed 
similar  mono-reserve  systems,  with  the  liabilities  of  the  central  bank  acting  as the 
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convertible  into  gold,  thus,  gold  was  the  ultimate  reserve  at  the  apex. 
Later,  states  discovered  that  imposition  of  a tax  made  payable  in  terms  of 
the  state’s  own  liabilities  would  generate  a demand  for  government  “fiat”  money 
(that  is,  government  money-denominated  short-term  liabilities--not  essentially 
different  from  bank  notes).  Finally,  government  debt  was  accepted  as  a means  of 
payment  and  medium  of  exchange;  at this  point,  neither  gold  backing  nor  a central 
bank  was  necessary--the  government  could  purchase  merely  by  “printing  money”, 
gladly  accepted  by  the  population  as  the  means  with  which  taxes  could  be  paid.6 
Perhaps  because  the  implications  were  not  fully  recognized,  states  continued  to 
maintain  a  sort  of  fiction--“selling  bonds”  to  the  central  bank,  which  then 
increased  central  bank  liabilities  (reserves  and  notes).  While  it  would  have  been 
easier  to  dispense  with  the  central  bank,  this  might  have  made  matters  too 
transparent--government  can  always  obtain  anything  for  sale  in  the  domestic 
money  of  account  merely  by  offering  fiat  money;  taxes  ensure  a demand  for  this 
fiat  money. 
However,  central  banks  gradually  discovered  that  their  position  at the  apex 
gave  them  the  ability  to  function  as  lenders  of  last  resort--historically,  the  second 
major  function  of  central  banking  (finally  understood  after  the  mid-nineteenth 
century).  As  they  could  essentially  provide  reserves  without  limit  merely  by 
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behavior  required  that  the  central  bank  abandon  narrow  self-interest,  a 
development  that  took  nearly  two  centuries  after  the  establishment  of  the  Bank  of 
England  to  come  to  pass.  This  greatly  increased  the  stability  of  the  capitalist 
system,  for  it  solves  the  primary  problem  of  a  commodity  reserve  system:  the 
supply  of  reserves  becomes  elastic  at  precisely  the  moment  that  reserves  are 
needed  and  maintains  orderly  markets.  But  under  a gold  standard,  even  the  central 
bank  is  ultimately  limited  by  its  gold  reserves,  so  its  ability  to  stop  a  crisis  is 
limited.  This  is  why  countries  invariably  went  off  the  gold  standard  whenever 
there  was  a  crisis,  and  this  is  why  a  gold  standard  is  not  consistent  with 
stabilization  of  the  capitalist  economy. 
Abandoning  the  gold  standard  was  a major  innovation  because  it made  the 
supply  of reserves  completely  elastic,  and  because  it eliminates  debt  deflation  and 
decumulation  at  the  aggregate  level.  Stabilization  requires  an  elastic  supply  of 
reserves,  and  to  the  extent  that  the  central  bank  tries  to  constrain  the  growth  of 
reserves,  it  abandons  its  responsibility  for  sustaining  accumulation.  Thus,  the 
orthodox  approach  to money  and  to policy  is historically  and  logically  flawed:  the 
Monetarist  policy  prescription  (close  control  over  the  quantity  of  reserves) 
represents  a giant  step  backward,  to  an  unstable  system  in  which  accumulation  is 
prone  to  reversals.  Furthermore,  Monetarist  policy  would  not  lead  to  greater 
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or of central  bank  liabilities)  has  never  determined  the  quantity  of money  supplied. 
The  current  system,  based  on  central  bank  reserves,  did  not  evolve  out  of 
a  commodity  money  system.  Rather,  the  commodity  money  evolved  out  of  an 
endogenous  money  system  to  solve  one  of  the  problems  with  a  monetary 
economy.  In  any  monetary  economy,  the  vast  majority  of  the  liabilities 
denominated  in  the  money  of  account  (indeed,  of  wealth  in  general)  consists  of 
private  IOUs,  the  value  of  which  depends  on  the  economic  condition  of  their 
issuers.  Thus,  commodity  money  developed  as  a  riskless  representation  of  the 
social  unit  of  account.  Privately-issued  money  was  made  convertible  into 
commodity  money  merely  to  enhance  circulation,  but,  was  never  constrained  by 
the  quantity  of  commodity  money  in  existence.  This  helps  to  make  it clear  that  an 
exogenous  money  system  is not  possible  in  an  economy  that  is based  on  nominal 
accumulation.  While  a  commodity  reserve  system  is  possible,  it  is  far  more 
unstable  than  a  central  bank  reserve  system.  Rather  than  attempting  to  constrain 
the  central  bank  so  that  its  liabilities  are  supplied  uif  we  had  a  commodity 
money  reserve  system,  it  is  far  better  to  maintain  the  current  accommodative 
reserve  system  in  domestic  economies.  As  we  shall  see,  a similar  arrangement  is 
required  for  the  international  economy. 
29 THE  RELATION  BETWEEN  MONEY  AND  CREDIT:  A  Brief  Digression 
Orthodox  theory  frequently  identifies  money  as  a  stock,  used  as  a  medium  of 
exchange  to  facilitate  spending  flows.  On  the  other  hand,  credit  is identified  with 
domestic  or  foreign  saving  flows;  it  is  used  to  finance  domestic  or  foreign 
investment  flows  or  flows  of  imports.  Some  Neoclassical  economists,  such  as 
Tsiang  (1980),  try  to  formulate  hybrid  models  in  which  money  stocks  that  are 
released  through  dishoarding  can  add  to  the  flow  of  saving  to  meet  the  demand 
for  loanable  funds.  But,  as  I’ll  argue,  credit  is  not  savings,  nor  is  it  dishoarding. 
Much  of  the  confusion  arising  in  discussions  of  money  is generated  by  an 
identification  of  it  with  certain  physical  representations  of  money,  such  as 
government  paper  money  and  coins,  bank  notes,  checks,  or  even  numbers  on 
computer  tapes  that  record  various  types  of  deposits.  This  focus  on  physical 
objects  obscures  the  fact  that  credit  really  represents  a  complex  social  relation. 
Credit  money  (as  I prefer  to  call  it)  is  a private,  money-denominated  liability. 
First,  credit  money  is denominated  in the  social  unit  of  account  (the  dollar 
in  the  US);  a  unit  of  account  is  by  its  very  nature  social,  and  it  cannot  have 
meaning  outside  that  social  context.  Second,  credit  money  is  “created”  when  one 
agent  issues  a liability  denominated  in the  social  unit  of  account,  and  this  liability 
is  accepted  by  another  agent.  Credit  money  is  never  created  for  inventory,  or  to 
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“borrower”  and  “lender”.  Enforcement  of  this  credit  relation  is  also  social--the 
recording  and  enforcement  of  debt  contracts  has  always  been  undertaken  by 
societv.7  Frequently,  credit  money  is  created  to  allow  one  to  “buy  now”  on  the 
promise  to  “pay  later”  by  delivering  a third  party  liability  denominated  in the  unit 
of  account  at  the  later  date.  Even  payment  (retirement  of  debt  and  destruction  of 
credit)  is  social  (entailing  the  delivery  of  a third  party  liability),  and  ability  to  do 
so  will  depend  to  a great  extent  on  economic  performance  of  society. 
This  can  be  contrasted  with  the  neoclassical  view  of  exchange  and 
“efficient  allocations”.  In  this  view,  scarce  resources  confront  unlimited  wants;  a 
system  of  relative  prices  is  generated  that  allocates  the  resources  in  an  efficient 
manner.  Credit,  however,  is  not  a  scarce  resource;  in  some  sense  there  is  an 
infinite  supply  of  credit  (the  quantity  is  limited  only  by  the  willingness  of 
“borrowers”  to  issue  liabilities  and  the  willingness  of  “lenders”  to  accept  them). 
In  the  neoclassical  world  with  no  uncertainty,  no  transactions  costs,  and  no 
externalities,  the  “efficient”  price  of  credit  would  be  zero,  as is the  efficient  price 
of  any  good  of  infinite  supply.  It  is not  surprising  that  the  neoclassical  world  has 
no  use  for  money  contracts. 
If  there  is  a  price  of  credit,  it  cannot  be  due  to  relative  scarcity  facing 
unlimited  wants.  Instead,  the  price  of  credit  has  to  do  with  the  existence  of  a 
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preference  generates  a  price  system  for  assets;  all  financial  assets  represent 
liabilities,  and  each  has  a price.  The  price  system  of  financial  assets  has  an impact 
on  the  rest  of  the  economy  through  its  effects  on  investment  (and,  to  a  lesser 
degree,  on  other  types  of  spending).  Capital  (that  is,  means  of  production)  must 
also  have  a  price;  its  supply  price  is  determined  in  the  price  system  for  current 
output,  while  its  demand  price  is  determined  in  the  asset  price  system;  it  will  be 
newly  produced  only  if its  demand  price  exceeds  its  supply  price.  (Minsky  1986) 
This  is  where  liquidity  preference  plays  a  role,  as  the  return  to  the  most  liquid 
asset  (usually  high  powered  money--HPM)  is  determined  by  the  preference  for 
liquidity.  All  other  assets  must  have  expected  returns  greater  than  this  return  to 
liquidity  in  order  for  them  to  find  homes;  thus,  asset  prices  adjust  to  equalize 
expected  returns.  As  Keynes  (1964)  argued,  the  return  to  liquidity  thus  sets  the 
standard  return  that  must  be  achieved  by  all  assets. 
Space  constraints  do  not  permit  me  to  go  beyond  this  initial  introduction 
to  the  role  of  liquidity  preference  and  its  effect  on  asset  prices,  except  to  note  that 
the  “price”  of  credit  is  not  determined  by  scarcity.’  Rather,  the  “price”  of  each 
liability  must  adjust  so  that  all  expected  returns  to  holders  of  these  liabilities  are 
equal.  This  means  that  a liability  that  promises  to  pay  a  “dollar”  one  year  hence 
cannot  in  general  obtain  a  “dollar”  today;  it must  be  discounted  not  because  of  a 
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the  spot  price  of  this  liability  today  might  be  ninety  cents;  the  expected  return  to 
the  holder  of  this  liability  is equal  to  ten  cents  over  the  course  of  the  year.  These 
“prices”  of  liabilities  do  not  “efficiently  allocate”  credit,  rather,  they  incorporate 
the  discounts  required  to  equate  expected  returns,  which,  in turn,  are  required  due 
to  uncertainty  which  generates  liquidity  preference.  The  effect  of  an  “increase  in 
supply”  (“reduction  of  scarcity”)  of  any  particular  type  of  liability  has  no  clear 
impact  on  its  price  (or  discount).”  Similarly,  it  makes  no  sense  to  speak  of 
independence  of  “supply”  and  “demand”  in the  case  of  credit;  liabilities  are  never 
issued  for  inventory.  Thus,  the  impact  of  an  “increase  of  demand”  for  credit  does 
not  have  a  simple  impact  on  its  “price”.  And  it  makes  no  sense  to  speak  of 
flexible  prices  of  credit  ensuring  “efficient  allocations”  of  a  “scarce  credit 
resource”. 
In contradistinction  to orthodox  Monetarists  who  advocate  close  control  by 
the  central  bank  over  the  “money  supply”,  other  orthodox  free  marketers  advocate 
a  “competitive  money  system”  with  complete  deregulation.  There  are  many 
fundamental  problems  with  proposals  that  would  unleash  “free markets”  to provide 
“mutual  funds  money”--that  is,  a  privately  issued  medium  of  exchange  whose 
value  would  be  market  determined--not  least  of  which  is  a misreading  of  history 
and  a misunderstanding  of  “money”.  Money  is the  social  unit  of  account  in which 
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Serious  problems  arise  when  liabilities  whose  values  fluctuate  relative  to  the 
money  of  account  are  the  basis  of  the  payments  system.  This  is why  all  capitalist 
countries  now  operate  with  a payments  system  using  liabilities  which  always  trade 
at  par--and  why  “free  markets”  voluntarily  abandoned  “mutual  funds  money”  as 
they  attempted  to  set-up  giro  systems  and  ghost  monies  in which  liabilities  would 
exchange  at  par  against  the  unit  of  account.  This  is  not  due  to  government 
intervention  into  a well-functioning  free  banking  system;  it  is  the  result  of  2000 
years  of  evolution  and  innovation  during  which  experimentation  proved  that  this 
is the  best  sort  of  system.  Those  institutions  which  became  able  to  issue  liabilities 
that  would  trade  at par  (that  is, without  discount  in  spot  markets)  naturally  had  an 
advantage  because  their  liabilities  would  force  others  from  the  payments  system. 
Over  time,  a  pyramidal  structure  was  developed  such  that  liabilities  could  be 
converted  at  par  to  those  higher  in  the  pyramid.  This,  however,  requires  that  the 
institution  that  is  higher  will  substitute  its  liabilities  without  limit  for  its 
correspondent  that  is  lower.  This  is why  all  capitalist  countries  develop  a “lender 
of  last  resort”  whose  liabilities  are  provided  on  demand  to  ensure  that  those  of 
institutions  lower  in the  pyramid  will  maintain  parity.  Any  agent  without  direct  or 
indirect  access  to the  lender  of last  resort  facility  cannot  maintain  spot  parity,  thus, 
cannot  issue  means  of  payment  or  media  of  exchange. 
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without  access  to  a lender  of  last  resort  is that  rational  behavior  leads  to  a run  out 
of  it  whenever  confidence  falls.  Self-interest  alone  will  not  generate  a  lender  of 
last  resort;  the  ultimate  lender  of  last  resort  must  act  against  its  own  narrow  self 
interest  whenever  there  is a run  in  order  to  save  the  system  as a whole.  A  system 
that  operates  on  individual  self-interest  cannot  be  stable  because  the  market  value 
of  liabilities  must  be  linked  to  asset  values;  unforeseen  depreciation  of  assets 
lowers  the  “free  market”  value  of  liabilities,  inducing  a run  out  of  these;  par  can 
be  maintained  only  if the  run  can  be  stopped  so  that  the  issuer  can  have  time  for 
a  work-out.  This  may  well  involve  lender  of  last  resort  activity  and  equity 
injections;  given  time,  some  assets  may  recover  value  or  the  issuer  may  be  able 
to  absorb  losses  through  future  profit  earnings. 
IMPLICATIONS  FOR  THE  INTERNATIONAL  FINANCIAL  SYSTEM 
“Free”  market  determination  of  exchange  rates  in  a “freely”  floating  regime  faces 
problems  similar  to  those  faced  by  “mutual  funds”  money  in  the  domestic 
economy.  A  system  with  mutual  funds  money  is  a  NUMS,  in  Davidson’s 
terminology;  as  mentioned  above,  “free  float”  exchange  rates  in  a  NUMS  are 
anchored  only  by  convention.  Speculative  runs  into/out  of  a  currency  can  easily swamp  flows  of  a currency  arising  from  its medium  of  exchange  function;  for  this 
reason,  speculation  can,  at times,  dominate  over  “fundamentals”  having  to do  with 
the  current  account  balance. 
Free  marketers  had  argued  that  flexible  exchange  rates  would  make 
adjustment  to  a balance  on  current  account  rapid  since  a deficit  nation  would  face 
loss  of  reserves  and  depreciation  of  the  currency.  In  reality,  countries  in  Latin 
America  and  the  US.  have  run  persistent  deficits  since  exchange  rates  became 
more  flexible.  Orthodox  economists  had  also  argued  that  flexible  exchange  rates 
would  increase  the  independence  of  countries  to  pursue  domestic  monetary  and 
fiscal  policy.  This  was  based  on  the  belief  that  floating  exchange  rates  could 
eliminate  trade  imbalances  without  necessitating  domestic  austerity  programs.  In 
reality,  austerity  has  been  used  as  the  major  adjustment  mechanism  for  most 
deficit  nations  (excluding  the  U.S.).  Rather  than  allowing  greater  independence  of 
nations  to  pursue  policy,  flexible  exchange  rates  have  increased  the  need  for 
greater  coordination  of  economic  policies  among  the  major  developed  countries. 
This  results  partly  from  the  tendency  of  flexible  exchange  rates  to  lead  to 
speculation;  at  times,  “capital  flows”  or  speculative  demand  for  currencies 
dominates  Purchasing  Power  Parity  in  determining  exchange  rates  so  that 
coordinated  intervention  is  necessary  to  stem  appreciation  (or  depreciation)  of  a 
currency.”  In  short,  the  1980s  have  not  been  kind  to  free  marketers.  The 
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of  goods  and  services  underlies  their  flawed  predictions  regarding  the  benefits  of 
floating  exchange  rates.  An  alternative  view  is  required. 
Most  importantly,  it  must  be  recognized  that  all  money-denominated 
liabilities  are  assets  that  carry  a price  so as to  generate  expected  returns  (q-c+l+a) 
such  that  each  finds  a  home.‘*  In  the  case  of  a  foreign  liability,  the  q’s  come 
from  the  explicit  interest  rate  and  the a’s from  expected  appreciation  (depreciation) 
of  the  foreign  currency;  the  liquidity  of  the  foreign  liability  depends,  on  the 
organization  of  secondary  markets  and  on  the  orderliness  of  these  markets--which 
depends,  in  turn,  on  the  existence  of  a  market-maker  to  limit  exchange  rate 
movements.  Under  a freely  flexible  exchange  rate  system,  the  liquidity  of  foreign 
liabilities  is  low;  their  expected  q’s  and/or  a’s  must  therefore  be  high  in  order  to 
find  homes  for  them.  Only  foreign  liabilities  denominated  in currencies  which  are 
expected  to remain  stable  (or to rise  in value)  will  have  orderly  markets,  thus,  will 
be  highly  liquid.  When  international  liquidity  preference  rises,  there  will  be  a run 
into  these  currencies  and  out  of  currencies  that  do  not  have  orderly  markets; 
expected  q’s  of  international  liabilities  must  adjust--with  those  of  illiquid  assets 
(especially  those  denominated  in currencies  expected  to depreciate)  rising  the  most 
(that  is,  discounts  rise  so  that  prices  fall  and  yields  rise). 
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currencies  that  are  expected  to  depreciate  must  fall  quickly--leading  to  further 
destabilizing  expectations  of  declining  prices.  As  Davidson  (1992)  argues,  if  the 
elasticity  of  expectations  exceeds  unity  (more  than  half  the  participants  in  the 
market  expect  the  currency  to depreciate  further),  then  self-interested  behavior  will 
cause  a  cumulative  depreciation  (through  a  “reflexive  process”)  of  the  currency, 
generating  a  run  out  of  it.  In  this  case,  a  flexible  exchange  rate  system  can  be 
made  stable  only  if  a market-maker  steps  in  to  stop  the  depreciation  by  setting  a 
floor  to  the  prices  of  liabilities  denominated  in  the  depreciating  unit  of  account. 
Within  a UMS,  money-denominated  liabilities  promise  to deliver,  say,  $100 
a  year  hence.  These  will  sell  for  a  spot  price  of,  say,  $90  today;  the  $100  to  be 
delivered  will  take  the  form  of  a  means  of  payment  (or  means  of  contractual 
settlement)--almost  certainly  a  short-term  bank  liability.  As  the  bank  liability 
within  a UMS  is guaranteed  to  exchange  at par  against  the  dollar  unit  of  account, 
there  is no  uncertainty  about  the  exchange  rate  of  the  means  of  payment  that  will 
be  used  one  year  hence  to  fulfill  the  terms  of  the  forward  contract  within  the 
UMS.  However,  in  a  NUMS,  additional  uncertainty  is  generated  if  the  forward 
contract  is  written  in  terms  of  a foreign  currency.  Even  if  the  means  of  payment 
is guaranteed  to  exchange  at par  against  the  foreign  currency,  there  is,  of  course, 
no  way  to  know  what  exchange  rate,  between  the  foreign  and  domestic  units  of 
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payment  to  be  delivered  is  not  fixed  at  par  against  the  foreign  unit  of  account. 
Modern  capitalist  countries  have  eliminated  this  uncertainty  by  abandoning 
“mutual  funds  money”  within  domestic  economies  through  the  use  of  media  of 
exchange  and  means  of  payment  whose  spot  price  is  fixed  against  the  domestic 
unit  of  account. 
Similarly,  attempts  have  been  made  to  eliminate  uncertainty  regarding 
exchange  rates  among  currencies.  As  discussed  above,  the  gold  standard 
represented  a relatively  recent  attempt  to  fix  exchange  rates  and  to  create  a UMS. 
This  was  not  the  first  attempt,  however.  The  so-called  giro  monies  and  ghost 
monies  also  created  a limited  UMS.  Often,  these  were  privately  established  UMSs; 
in  other  cases,  they  were  set  up  by  governments.  The  problem  with  a  UMS  run 
by  private,  profit-seeking  institutions,  however,  is,  as  discussed  above,  that  the 
market-making  function  can  conflict  with  individual  self-interest;  the problem  with 
a UMS  based  on  gold  reserves  of  a central  bank  is  the  inelasticity  of  reserves. 
A  lender  of  last  resort  is  needed  to  set  a  floor  to  asset  prices--that  is,  to 
establish  orderly  markets.  In the  case  of assets  that  are  to be  used  as the  dominant 
media  of  exchange  and  means  of  payment  (or  means  of  contractual  settlement), 
the  lender  of  last  resort  usually  ensures  that  the  spot  price  of  the  asset  equals  one, 
or,  that  it trades  at par  against  high  powered  money.  (This  ensures  that  these  are, 
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these  assets  need  not  equal  one;  the  discount  will  depend  on  the  state  of  liquidity 
preference.  However,  given  guaranteed  spot  prices,  forward  contracts  can  then  be 
written  within  the  UMS  specifying  delivery  of the  means  of payment  in the  future. 
Similarly,  in  the  international  sphere,  a  UMS  reduces  uncertainty  involved  in 
making  forward  contracts.  An  international  lender  of  last  resort  sets  a floor  to  the 
value  of  each  national  unit  of  account  relative  to the  international  unit  of  account, 
even  if  the  international  unit  (say,  a ghost  pound)  doesn’t  explicitly  exist.  This  is 
done  by  keeping  relative  exchange  rates  constant.  In  practice,  this  can  be 
accomplished  by  an  international  lender  of  last  resort  for  the  national  central 
banks;  these,  in  turn,  act  as lenders  of  last  resort  within  their  domestic  economies. 
Implementation  of fixed  exchange  rates  is not  without  difficulties.  We have 
long  operated  within  the  US  with  an  UMS;  this  sets  fixed  exchange  rates  across 
all  regions  of  the  country.  Such  a  fixed  exchange  rate  system  creates  various 
inequities--there  is no  doubt,  for  example,  that  some  regions  of  the  country  have 
higher  rates  of  productivity.‘3  This  has  been  dealt  with  in  two  different  ways:  the 
various  Federal  Reserve  Banks  were  designed  to  set  discount  rates  independently. 
This  would  allow  a  smaller  discount  on  forward  contracts  in  the  disadvantaged 
regions  in  the  belief  that  this  might  stimulate  the  regional  economy.  In  practice, 
differential  discount  rates  do  not  play  a major  role  in  the  US,  perhaps  because  it 
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regions.  The  other  way  in  which  we  have  managed  to  reduce  the  inequity  of  the 
UMS  has  been  to  allow  different  prices  (particularly  for  inputs  to  the  production 
process)  among  regions.  (Of  course,  there  are  a  variety  of  other  policies  which 
have  been  adopted  to  deal  with  unequal  development,  including  various  types  of 
fiscal  policy--income  redistribution,  favorable  tax  treatment,  and  so  on--but  these 
will  be  ignored  here.)  As  Hahn  (199 1) recognized,  flexible  prices  within  regions 
represent  an  alternative  (but  certainly  not  “ideal  substitute”,  as he  had  argued)  for 
flexible  exchange  rates  among  regions. 
If  an  international  UMS  is  adopted,  inequities  caused  by  setting  the 
exchange  rate  “too  high”  for  some  currencies  and  “too  low”  for  others  will  be 
inevitable.  Again,  differential  discount  rates  can  be  used  by  the  international 
lender  of  last  resort  to  reduce  inequities;  a lower  discount  rate  would  be  offered 
to  those  countries  whose  exchange  rate  appeared  “too  high”.  Similarly,  countries 
can  also  adapt  to  inappropriate  exchange  rates  through  inflation  or  deflation 
(“flexible  domestic  prices”)--the  method  used  in  the  case  of  the  U.S.  However, 
deflation  is especially  onerous  in any  economy  which  uses  forward  contracts--that 
is,  in  any  monetary  economy--and  significant  deflation  cannot  occur  without 
causing  default  on  nominal  forward  contracts.  For  this  reason,  a  country  whose 
exchange  rate  has  been  set  too  high  cannot  be  expected  to  adjust  through 
41 deflation;  the  burden  of  adjustment  can  only  be  carried  by  those  whose  exchange 
rates  were  set  too  low,  as  these  can  inflate.  In  a monetary  economy,  inflation  is 
always  preferable  to  deflation. 
However,  the  preferred  course  of action  would  be  to readjust  the  exchange 
rates.  It  will  never  be  simple  to  determine  the  “proper”  exchange  rate  for  a 
currency;  however,  it will  be  easier  to determine  this  in the  absence  of  speculation 
against  the  currency.  Once  speculation  is  removed,  Purchasing  Power  Parity  is 
more  likely  to  play  a  dominant  role  in  determination  of  exchange  rates.14 
However,  speculation  cannot  be  removed  without  creating  the  expectation  that 
exchange  rates  will  be  fixed.  Once  this  is  done,  it  will  be  somewhat  easier  to 
determine  if  the  exchange  rate  is  “too  high”  or  “too  low”;  in  the  presence  of 
speculation,  this  is nearly  impossible  to determine  because  the  exchange  rate  is set 
primarily  by  convention.  To  prevent  recurrence  of  speculation,  it is necessary  that 
the  expectation  is  that  exchange  rates  will  not  be  changed;  thus,  changes  should 
be  made  only  rarely. 
If  we  are  to move  to  a world  UMS,  what  is to  be  used  as the  international 
unit  of  account?  One  option  would  be  to  adopt  a universal  unit  of  account  for  use 
within  each  country  and  among  all  countries;  this,  of  course,  mimics  the  current 
domestic  UMS  used  in  the  US.  If  this  route  were  followed,  the  international  unit 
could  be  based  on  some  existing  national  unit  (say,  the  dollar)  or  on  a  newly 
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political  considerations.  There  is  apparently  a widespread  notion  that  current  & 
facto  adoption  of  the  dollar  for  most  international  trade  is unfair  because  it gives 
the  US  an  unlimited  ability  to purchase  the  output  of  foreign  countries  and  to  run 
persistent  deficits.  Actually,  of course,  when  dollar  liabilities  are issued,  these  give 
a claim  to  holders  over  US  goods,  services,  or assets.  If the  holders  prefer  to  hold 
their  dollar-denominated  wealth  in  the  form  of  financial  assets,  then  the  US  is 
“forced”  to  run  trade  deficits  because  those  with  the  power  to  buy  US  output 
refuse  to  exercise  this  power.  Use  of the  dollar  as the  international  unit  of  account 
gives  the  US  no  extraordinary  advantage--but  political  resistance  to  this  would  be 
great. 
Assuming  the  ghost  pound  is  adopted,  all  agents  would  then  be  permitted 
to  issue  liabilities  denominated  in  the  ghost  pound;  under  a  single  currency 
system,  exchange  rates  cannot  fluctuate.  All  adjustment  would  be  through  one  of 
two  price  systems:  that  for  current  output  and  that  for  assets.  While  all  liabilities 
would  be  denominated  in  the  ghost  pound,  the  value  of  any  particular  liability 
would  be  determined  by  q-c+l+a.  However,  each  domestic  central  bank  would 
determine  which  liabilities  maintain  spot  parity  against  the  ghost  pound--through 
lender  of  last  resort  activities  that  guarantee  orderly  markets.  As  each  domestic 
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money  of  account,  it  could  always  set  a floor  to  spot  asset  prices. 
The  problem  with  this  arrangement  is  immediately  apparent.  Such  lender 
of  last  resort  creates  “orderly”  markets,  but  this  removes  “market  discipline”.  So 
long  as  the  central  bank  does  not  worry  about  its  own  narrow  self  interest, 
nationalistic  considerations  could  cause  it to widen  the  lender  of last  resort  activity 
until  all  domestic  liabilities  are  covered  by  guarantees.  Essentially,  this  then 
violates  the  rule  that  one  cannot  discharge  one’s  debts  by  issuing  an  IOU--if  the 
central  bank  always  guarantees  one’s  IOUs,  one  is never  forced  to discharge  one’s 
debts.  The  UMS  would  certainly  break  down  as  exchange  rates  would  reappear 
among  the  “ghost  pounds”  used  by  different  countries. 
Perhaps  the  use  of  an  international  ghost  pound  as  the  unit  of  account 
would  work  only  with  world  integration--that  is, with  a truly  international  financial 
system  and  a  single  central  bank--because  of  the  social  nature  of  the  unit  of 
account.  Perhaps  the  right  to  determine  which  liabilities  always  have  spot  parity 
against  the  unit  of  the  account  is the  last  refuge  of  national  economic  autonomy. 
Keynes  seemed  to  recognize  this  when  he  argued  that  an  “International  Clearing 
Union”  (to  be  discussed  momentarily)  “might  become  the  pivot  of  the  future 
economic  government  of  the  world.”  (Keynes  1980:  189) 
44 An  alternative  that  is  consistent  with  the  “rules  of  the  game”,  but  which 
can  provide  a way  out  when  necessary,  is  required.  In  this  spirit,  Keynes  called 
for  the  creation  of  an  International  Clearing  Union  (ICU)  based  on  a bancor  unit 
of  account;  the  bancor,  in  turn,  would  be  fixed  in  value  relative  to  gold  and  then 
all  the  currencies  of  all countries  participating  in the  ICU  would  be  fixed  in  value 
relative  to  the  bancor.  The  bancor  would  be  used  only  for  clearing  purposes 
among  countries;  countries  could  buy  bancor  balances  from  the  ICU  using  gold, 
but  bancors  could  not  be  redeemed  for  gold.  In  this  way,  bancor  reserves  could 
never  leave  the  system--eliminating  any  possibility  of  a run  on  bancors. 
The  initial  quantity  of bancor  reserves  would  be allocated  among  countries 
based  on  their  previous  levels  of  imports  and  exports.  Countries  which  then  ran 
trade  surpluses  would  accumulate  further  bancor  reserves,  while  deficit  countries 
would  lose  reserves.  The  ICU  would  provide  overdraft  facilities  to those  countries 
that  exhausted  their  reserves.  Since  reserves  could  not  leave  the  system,  the  ICU 
could  always  expand  the  supply  of  bancor  reserves  merely  by  making  advances 
to  deficit  countries.  In  addition,  surplus  countries  could  use  bancor  reserves  to 
make  loans  to,  investments  in,  or  unilateral  grants  to  deficit  countries. 
The  ICU  would  adopt  rules  regarding  sanctions  to  be  placed  on  such 
debtors  and  on  countries  which  ran persistent  surpluses  (thus,  accumulated  bancor 
reserves).  Keynes  called  for  a  charge  on  excessive  overdrafts  a@  on  excessive 
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trade.  Other  possible  actions  to  be  taken  in  the  case  of  deficit  countries  would 
include:  currency  devaluation,  capital  controls,  seizure  of  gold  reserves,  and 
domestic  policy  “which  may  appear  to  be  appropriate  to  restore  the  equilibrium 
of  its  international  balance”.  (Keynes  1980:  462)  Actions  to  be  taken  in  the  case 
of  surplus  countries  include:  measures  to  expand  domestic  demand,  appreciation 
of  the  currency,  reduction  of  tariffs  and  other  trade  barriers,  and  encouragement 
of international  development  loans.  (Keynes  1980: 463)  Finally,  the  ICU  could  use 
its  power  to  encourage  economic  development  through  the  use  of  overdrafts  for 
relief  work,  for  development  of  buffer  stocks  of  commodities  to  provide  “ever- 
normal  granaries”,  for  the  establishment  of  an  International  Investment 
Corporation,  and  to  help  stabilize  prices.  (Keynes  1980:  190) 
Similarly,  Davidson  (1992)  has  proposed  the  use  of  an  international 
clearing  money  unit  (ICMU)  as an international  reserve  used  only  by  central  banks 
in  an  international  UMS.  Each  country  would  continue  to  use  its  unique  money 
of  account  for  domestic  purposes;  private  agents  could  choose  any  of  these 
moneys  of  account  for  international  purposes.  Exchange  rates  among  the 
international  moneys  of  account  would  be  fixed  (with  allowance  made  for 
adjustments  under  specified  conditions).  Clearing  among  central  banks  would  then 
take  place  on  the  books  of  an  international  central  bank,  kept  in  ICMUs.  The 
46 ICMUs  would  be  used  only  for  clearing  purposes  among  central  banks.  As  in 
Keynes’s  scheme,  sanctions  would  be  placed  on  countries  that  continually  faced 
clearing  drains,  and  would  also  be  placed  on  those  countries  that  continually 
accumulated  reserves  of  ICMUs.  As  Davidson  explains,  this  allows  creditor 
nations  to  share  the  burden  of  adjustment  with  deficit  nations;  this  has  three 
justifications:  i) creditor  nations  can  “afford”  to  bear  the  costs  of  adjustment;  ii) 
creditor  nations  may  share  the  “blame”  for  deficits  of  others;  iii)  placing  the  full 
burden  of  adjustment  on  deficit  countries  contributes  to  worldwide  stagnation  if 
it  forces  them  to  use  austerity.  Under  the  Keynes-Davidson  scheme,  the  creditor 
nations  will  lose  their  ICMU  reserves  if  they  don’t  use  them;  these  would  then 
have  an  incentive  to  stimulate  their  economies  so  that  the  ICMU  reserves  would 
be  used  to  support  greater  imports  or  greater  foreign  investment;  alternatively, 
excess  ICMUs  could  be  given  as grants.  The  international  central  bank  would  act 
as  lender  of  last  resort  for  the  deficit  countries  once  they  have  lost  their  ICMU 
reserves.  This  intervention,  however,  would  come  with  strings  attached,  comprised 
of  a  combination  of  rules  and  discretionary  actions  taken  by  the  international 
central  bank.  Because  the  creditor  nations  would  be  similarly  forced  to  rectify 
their  balance  sheet  flows,  adjustment  by  the  deficit  nations  would  not  be  so 
difficult--they  would  be  trying  to increase  exports  precisely  when  the  creditors  are 
trying  to  increase  imports. 
47 Since  the  ICMU  reserves  could  always  be  expanded  without  limit  by  the 
international  central  bank,  it  could  always  maintain  fixed  exchange  rates  among 
international  units  of  account  by  purchasing  the  liabilities  of  the  central  bank  of 
any  nation  facing  pressure  to  depreciate.  Essentially,  the  international  central 
banker  would  operate  as the  ultimate  market-maker,  with  its ICMU  at the  very  top 
of  the  debt  pyramid.  It  would  guarantee  that  the  liabilities  of  all  central  banks 
were  fully  liquid  internationally;  each  central  bank  would  then  choose  which 
liabilities  would  be  fully  liquid  nationally.  However,  the  threat  of  sanctions  to  be 
imposed  by  the  international  central  banker  on  those  countries  that  continually 
experienced  a clearing  drain  would  force  the  national  central  banker  to  behave  in 
an  appropriate  manner  domestically.  It  must  be  remembered  that  it  is  very  easy 
to  set  a  floor  to  asset  prices  (whether  domestically  or  internationally);  it  is much 
harder  to  set  price  ceilings.  Once  fear  of  failure  is  removed,  “market  discipline” 
cannot  operate  to  constrain  asset  prices.  The  prices  of  assets  are  not  determined 
by  scarcity,  as  discussed  above,  but  by  q-c+l+a.  If  depreciation  is  eliminated  and 
full  liquidity  is  guaranteed,  this  is  taken  into  account  when  asset  prices  are 
determined.  Thus,  lender  of  last  resort  guarantees  cannot  be  adopted  without  a 
system  of  sanctions  to  be  applied  when  intervention  does  occur. 
While  the  Keynes-Davidson  proposal  seems  to be perfectly  consistent  with 
the  analysis  presented  above  which  focuses  on  money  as  a  unit  of  account,  the 
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money  as medium  of  exchange.  Of  course,  the  argument  adopted  by  Keynes  was 
above  all pragmatic  given  the  political  implications  of the  proposal.  Thus,  he  may 
not  have  been  interested  in  the  theoretical  basis  of  his  proposal.  However,  let  us 
briefly  examine  and  critique  his  argument. 
Keynes  began  with  the  argument  that  his  goal  is to  design  an  international 
currency  system  so  that  the  currency  exchange  will  be  made  to  operate  as  if 
countries  were  “trading  goods  against  goods”.  (Keynes  1980:  18)  “The  principal 
object  can  be  explained  in  a  single  sentence:  to  provide  that  money  earned  by 
selling  goods  to  one  country  can  be  spent  on  purchasing  the  products  of  any  other 
country.”  (Keynes  1980:  270)  The  operation  of  the  ICU  would  be  designed  to 
ensure  that  bancor  reserves  would  not  be  lost  to  idle  hoards;  rather,  the  reserves 
of  one  country  would  form  the  basis  of  overdrafts  of  another.  Keynes  argued  that 
his  proposal  would  merely  “generalise  the  essential  principle  of  banking  as  it  is 
exhibited  within  any  closed  system.”  (Keynes  1980:  17 1) This  will  substitute  an 
expansionist  tendency  in  place  of  a stagnationist  tendency. 
In  short,  the  analogy  with  a  national  banking  system  is  complete.  No 
depositor  in  a  local  bank  suffers  because  the  balances,  which  he  leaves 
idle,  are  employed  to  finance  the  business  of  someone  else.  Just  as  the 
development  of  national  banking  systems  served  to  offset  a  deflationary 
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modern  industry,  so by  extending  the  same  principle  into  the  international 
field  we  may  hope  to  offset  the  contractionist  pressure  which  might 
otherwise  overwhelm  in social  disorder  and  disappointment  the  good  hopes 
of  our  modem  world.  The  substitution  of  a credit  mechanism  in  place  of 
hoarding  would  have  repeated  in  the  international  field  the  same  miracle, 
already  performed  in  the  domestic  field,  of  turning  a  stone  into  bread. 
(Keynes  1980:  177) 
This  is because  hoarded  reserves  lower  world  aggregate  demand  and  employment; 
if instead  reserves  form  the  basis  of  loans,  world  demand  and  employment  would 
be  higher. 
According  to  the  perspective  adopted  above,  there  are  two  problems  with 
Keynes’s  argument.  First,  an international  monetary  system  cannot  be  designed  as 
if  trade  were  “goods  against  goods”.  The  fundamental  activity  of  any  capitalist 
economy  consists  of  position-taking  in  assets  that  are  expected  to  generate  gross 
income  denominated  in  money  terms.  So  long  as  foreign  ownership  of  assets  is 
permitted,  the  international  monetary  system  must  be  designed  with  this  in  mind. 
While  I certainly  would  not  advocate  “free market  capital  flows”,  it does  not  seem 
desirable  to  eliminate  “capital  flows”  altogether.  The  goal  of  Keynes’s  ICU  or 
Davidson’s  ICMU  is  not  to  limit  trade  to  “goods  against  goods”,  but  to  eliminate 
50 speculation  against  currencies  that  arises  from  floating  exchange  rates.  In  other 
words,  the  goal  is  to  remove  expected  currency  appreciation  as  a  component  of 
the  expected  returns  that  foreign  assets  can  deliver.15 
Second,  Keynes’s  banking  analogy  is confused.  While  he  is correct  in  his 
assertion  that  prohibiting  conversion  of  bancors  jr&~  gold  will  eliminate  the 
possibility  of  a run  developing  on  bancors,  his  argument  that  the  existence  of  the 
ICU  ensures  that  bancor  reserves  will  necessarily  form  the  basis  of  loans  is 
flawed.16  His  plan  is  not  expansionist  merely  because  reserves  remain  in  the 
system;  rather,  it  is  expansionist  because  it  eliminates  exchange  rate  uncertainty, 
encouraging  the  use  of  forward  contracts  and  reducing  speculative  and 
precautionary  reserve  balances.  If  creditor  nations  can  be  encouraged  to  increase 
domestic  demand  for  the  output  of  deficit  nations,  or  to  employ  labor  in  deficit 
nations  in order  to  generate  foreign  investment,  then  Keynes’s  plan  will  indeed  be 
expansionist.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  creditor  nation  merely  prefers  to  hold  its 
surplus  in  the  form  of  paper  claims  on  foreigners,  then  Keynes’s  proposal  does 
nothing  to  stimulate  world  demand.  The  form  in which  the  creditor  nation  chooses 
to  hold  its  wealth  depends,  of  course,  on  the  state  of  liquidity  preference;  it  is 
primarily  the  fixed  exchange  rate  system  which  is expected  to  lower  the  return  to 
liquidity  that  will  be  required  to  raise  the  expected  returns  (q-c+l+a)  from  capital 
investment  sufficiently  to  stimulate  world  demand. 
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I  hope  that  the  “Post  Keynesian”  view  of  money  as  a  unit  of  account,  and  the 
necessity  of  maintaining  parity  of  the  media  of  exchange  and  means  of  payment 
against  the  unit  of  account  provides  a  more  powerful  theoretical  argument  for 
Keynes’s  proposal  than  that  advanced  by  Keynes  himself.  If we  retreat  to the  view 
that  money  is  primarily  the  medium  of  exchange  and  if  we  focus  on  “real 
exchange”  in  which  money  merely  lubricates  the  market  mechanism,  then  the 
arguments  for  fixed  exchange  rates  are  not  strong.  A  general  equilibrium  price 
vector  should  have  room  for  inclusion  of  exchange  rates  as  “prices”  of  currencies; 
if  we  essentially  remain  within  the  barter  paradigm  of  relative  prices  serving  as 
signals,  then  there  can  be  no justification  for  fixed  exchange  rates.  As  Hahn  says, 
even  uncertainty  over  exchange  rates  cannot  generate  a convincing  argument  for 
fixed  rates  since  flexible  exchange  rates  reduce  uncertainty  over  employment. 
In  contrast,  the  Post  Keynesian  view  leads  immediately  to  a justification 
for  fixed  exchange  rates;  exchange  rates  are not  merely  seen  as relative  prices  that 
emerge  from  trade,  but  as  ratios  of  the  units  of  account  in  which  monetary 
contracts  are  written.  Fixing  these  ratios  as  part  of  a comprehensive  reformation 
of  the  international  financial  system  will  merely  apply  at the  international  level  the 
step  taken  in every  developed  country  at the  national  level.  In the  domestic  sphere, 
52 capitalist  countries  moved  from  “mutual  funds  money”  to  “par  money”  based  on 
gold  reserves,  and  finally  to  “par  money”  based  on  central  bank  reserves.  In  the 
international  sphere,  we  moved  from  “mutual  funds  money”  to  giro  and  ghost 
money,  to  a gold  standard  and  then  backwards  to  flexible  exchange  rates. 
In  summary,  establishing  fixed  exchange  rates,  a bancor  or  an  ICMU,  and 
an  international  central  bank  has  the  following  benefits: 
1. Expected  appreciation/depreciation  of  a currency  no  longer  plays  a role 
in  determining  asset  prices. 
2.  Use  of  forward  contracts  is  encouraged  because  uncertainty  over 
exchange  rates  is  removed. 
3.  Speculation  in  currencies  is  eliminated. 
4.  The  volume  of  reserves  (of  gold  and  foreign  currencies)  that  must  be 
held  (for  speculative  and precautionary  purposes)  by  national  central  banks 
and  private  agents  is  reduced. 
5.  A  method  of  dealing  with  trade  imbalances  is created  that  doesn’t  rely 
on  austerity.  This  carries  over  to  the  international  sphere  practices  that  are 
frequently  adopted  domestically.  (A nation  normally  doesn’t  force  austerity 
onto  a  region  that  runs  a  trade  deficit  with  the  rest  of  the  nation.  Of 
course,  the  US  could  deal  with  such  imbalances  more  rationally  than  it has 
in  the  past.) 
53 6.  It  reduces  the  need  for  international  coordination.  In  spite  of  the  claim 
of  free  marketers,  the  flexible  exchange  rate  system  actually  increased 
intervention  into  foreign  currency  markets  by  governments  as  they 
attempted  to  deal  with  problems  brought  on,  for  the  most  part,  by  flexible 
exchange  rates. 
7.  The  bancor  or  IMCU  plan  eliminates  stagnationist  tendencies  in  world 
economies,  recognizing  that  capitalist  economies  require  accumulation  of 
money-denominated  wealth. 
Perhaps  the  primary  result  of  the  flexible  exchange  rate  system  has  been 
to allow  national  central  banks  to pursue  control  of domestic  inflation  with  single- 
minded  abandon.  When  combined  with  the  stagnationary  influences  caused  by  the 
asymmetric  adjustment  problem  whereby  trade  deficit  nations  pursue  austerity  (not 
matched  by  expansionary  policies  of  trade  surplus  countries),  this  has  contributed 
to  worldwide  stagnation.  Keynes’s  bancor  proposal  would  encourage  surplus 
nations  to  undertake  expansion  and  would  limit  austerity  imposed  on  deficit 
nations.  While  it is beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper,  domestic  policy  must  also  be 
redirected  away  from  concern  with  inflation;  it  should  be  noted,  however,  that  it 
is ironic  that  orthodox  economists  are  so concerned  with  the  uncertainty  generated 
in  the  domestic  economy  by  inflation  but  are  so  willing  to  sweep  aside  the 
uncertainty  caused  by  fluctuating  exchange  rates,  even  when  theory  and  evidence 
54 suggest  that  the  uncertainty  caused  by  moderate  inflation  is  minuscule  when 
compared  with  that  generated  by  wildly  fluctuating  exchange  rates. 
55 NOTES 
1.  As  Ingrao  and  Israel  (1990)  demonstrate,  the  invariant  paradigm  of  general 
equilibrium  theory  has  been  to  demonstrate  the  existence,  uniqueness,  and  global 
stability  of  equilibrium.  While  it has  been  shown  that  equilibrium  does  exist  for 
the  hypothesized  barter  economy  under  quite  general  assumptions,  uniqueness  of 
this  equilibrium  can  be  shown  only  under  unacceptably  restrictive  assumptions; 
proof  of  stability  is  even  more  difficult  to  obtain. 
2.  Thus,  the  interest  rate  is  not  the  rate  of  time  preference.  See  below. 
3. Part  of the  reason  that  historians  focus  on  coins  is due  to the  relative  abundance 
of  coin  and  the  severe  scarcity  of  surviving  evidence  of private  credit  monies.  Not 
only  is  evidence  of  private  contracts  unlikely  to  survive  due  to  the  physical  form 
it takes  (eg:  written  on paper),  but  also  because  once  a private  contract  is fulfilled 
there  is  no  reason  to  preserve  it.  When  you  meet  contractual  obligations  to  your 
neighbor  so  that  your  IOU  is  returned,  you  destroy  the  IOU.  It  would  be  silly  to 
retain  it  for  posterity. 
4.  One  might  wonder  why  anyone  would  ever  lend.  Sometimes,  the  loans  were 
forced;  but  some  were  voluntary  in  order  to  get  concessions.  Sometimes  the 
Crown  would  borrow  against  future  taxes--it  would  farm  out  the  tax  collections 
to  the  lenders,  reducing  the  uncertainty. 
56 5. This  wasn’t  actually  the  first  time  government  fiat  money  was  created--Italian 
city  states  had  been  able  to  do  it hundreds  of  years  earlier.  But  this  was  because 
all  citizens  were  responsible  for  city  debts.  This  was  not  true  once  you  had  the 
development  of  monarchies--crown  debt  was  not  the  debt  of  citizens. 
6.  See  Knapp  (1924)  and  Wray  (1993a). 
7. Davidson  (1990)  emphasizes  the  importance  of  the  existence  and  enforcement 
of  the  “civil  law  of  contracts”  in  creating  the  conditions  under  which  forward 
contracts  in  money  terms  are  made  possible. 
8. Liquidity  preference  can  be  defined  as  a preference  for  liquid  assets,  which  in 
turn  can  be  defined  as  those  assets  that  can  be  sold  quickly  with  little  chance  of 
loss  of  value.  Existential  uncertainty  is  said  to  be  the  source  of  liquidity 
preference. 
9.  For  a more  detailed  treatment,  see  Wray  (1992). 
10. As  Wray  (1992)  shows,  an  increase  of  “money  demand”  normally  induces  an 
increase  of  “money  supply”;  the  effect  on  asset  prices  is  determined  in  a  very 
complex  way  so  that  this  cannot  in  general  be  pre-determined. 
11. According  to the  “purchasing  power  parity”  theory,  equilibrium  exchange  rates 
should  ensure  that  the  “real”  price  of  a  commodity  will  be  equalized  across 
currencies  (ignoring  transactions  costs  such  as transportation);  thus,  if  one  dollar 
equals  two  marks  in  foreign  exchange  markets,  then  an  item  that  costs  one  dollar 
57 in  the  US  should  cost  two  marks  in  Germany.  If  a  commodity  that  sold  for  a 
dollar  in  the  US  were  selling  for  a  mark  in  Germany,  then  (again,  ignoring 
transportation  costs)  it would  be  profitable  to  trade  one  dollar  for  two  marks,  and 
then  to  buy  two  units  of  the  commodity  in  Germany  for  sale  in  the  US  (since  the 
dollar  could  buy  only  one  unit  in  the  US).  Exports  would  flow  from  Germany, 
driving  up  the  value  of  the  mark  until  “real” prices  were  equalized.  However,  this 
does  not  appear  to  hold  in  the  real  world,  where  “real”  prices  do  not  seem  to  be 
equalized  across  currencies.  This  is  because  currencies  are  desired  not  only  for 
purchases  of  goods  and  services,  but  also  for  “capital”  transactions  (purchases  and 
sales  of  assets  internationally).  Indeed,  “capital”  transactions  currently  swamp 
international  trade  in goods  and  services.  Capital  transactions  include  “investment” 
in  real  and  financial  assets,  but  also  include  transactions  in  derivatives  and  other 
complex  financial  instruments.  An  indeterminant  amount  of capital  transactions  is 
nothing  more  than  speculative  behavior. 
12. This  analysis  follows  from  Keynes  (1964).  Keynes  had  defined  g  as the  yield 
(or  coupon)  of  an  asset,  c  as  its  carrying  cost  (“wastage”,  depreciation),  1 as  its 
liquidity  return,  and  a as  its  expected  appreciation/depreciation  in  nominal  terms. 
The  liquidity  return  is  a  subjective  return,  with  liquid  assets  providing  greater 
subjective  amounts  of  liquidity.  While  illiquid  assets  obtain  very  little  1, their  q’s 
can  be  large.  Carrying  cost  (‘cJ would  be  large  for  physical  assets  that  depreciate 
58 (machinery  that  is  used  up,  wheat  that  rots),  while  it  would  be  negligible  for 
highly  liquid  assets  like  money.  In  equilibrium,  the  total  return  q-c+l+a  is 
equalized  on  assets. 
13.  This  implies  different  equilibrium  exchange  rates  consistent  with  Purchasing 
Power  Parity  if wages  are  equalized--as  Hahn  argued,  flexible  exchange  rates  can 
compensate  for  inflexible  wages,  so that  if government  policy  or union  bargaining 
equalizes  wages  across  the  country,  then  the  “dollar”  in  the  low  productivity  part 
of  the  country  should  exchange  at  less  than  par  with  a  “dollar”  from  a  high 
productivity  region.  This  is not  permitted  within  the  country,  however. 
14.  This  is  admittedly  nothing  more  than  a  guess;  no  one  can  know  whether 
deviations  from  Purchasing  Power  Parity  are  largely  a  function  of  international 
speculation.  Perhaps  capital  controls  would  also  be necessary.  By  the  way,  Keynes 
had  argued  that  nothing  is more  certain  than  that  capital  flows  must  be  controlled. 
(Keynes  1980:  25) 
15.  Thus,  while  reduction  of  currency  speculation  would  move  us  closer  to 
Keynes’s  goal  (to make  the  system  operate  asif  trade  were  “goods  against  goods” 
(with  “real”  prices  equalized  as  in  the  Purchasing  Power  Parity  theory),  this  goal 
would  never  be  reached  because  other  capital  flows  would  continue. 
16. Indeed,  as  all  who  accept  the  endogenous  approach  to  money  are  aware,  it  is 
59 loans  of  bancors  that  create  the  reserves  of bancors  held  by  surplus  nations--loans 
create  deposits. 
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